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Abstract 
We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific 
public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently 
within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only 
the highest effort (the best-shot) within each group represents the group effort that determines 
the winning group. We fully characterize the set of equilibria and show that in any 
equilibrium at most one player in each group exerts strictly positive effort. There always 
exists an equilibrium in which only the highest value player in each active group exerts 
strictly positive effort. However, perverse equilibria may exist in which the highest value 
players completely free-ride on others by exerting no effort. We provide conditions under 
which the set of equilibria can be restricted and discuss contest design implications. 
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1. Introduction 
Groups often confront each other in order to win a prize. Individual group members 
contribute costly efforts to the ‘group effort’ which can increase the probability of winning by 
their group. The prize can be of a public-good nature in the sense that every group member of 
the winning group earns the prize even if he does not contribute to the group effort at all. 
Examples of this setting include sports events between teams, rent-seeking contest between 
lobbying groups, electoral confrontation, or war between coalitions. 
Most studies on contests between groups use a perfect-substitutes group impact 
function in which the efforts of the group members within a group are perfectly substitutable 
and hence a group’s effort is determined by the sum of members’ efforts in that group.1 
However, Lee (2012) analyzes a group contest with the weakest-link group impact function 
where the efforts of the members within a group are perfectly complementary and thus the 
minimum effort among the group members represents the group effort. Kolmar and 
Rommeswinkel (2010) further study group contests employing a constant elasticity of 
substitution group impact function, which allows the impact function of a group to become a 
perfect-substitute type or a weakest-link type with different degree of complementarity 
accordingly to the elasticity of substitution of efforts within the group. In the current paper 
we study a group contest with a best-shot group impact function, where individual group 
members exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently, but only the highest effort 
within each group represents the group effort. 
                                                    
1 A function that translates the efforts of individual group members into the group effort is called a group 
impact function. The literature on group contest originated with the work of Katz et al. (1990). Katz et al. use 
symmetric players within each group, a perfect-substitutes group impact function (Bergstrom et al., 1986), and a 
lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980). Most follow-up studies on group contests use the perfect-
substitutes group impact function (Baik, 1993; Baik and Shogren, 1998; Baik et al., 2001; Baik, 2008; Münster, 
2009). There is also a growing experimental literature examining contests between groups (Abbink et al., 2010; 
Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011; Cason et al., 2012), for a review see Dechenaux 
et al. (2012).  
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Best-shot contests are readily observed in the field. Among sporting events, the 
Fourball golf format in which a team performance is noted as the lowest score between the 
two team members is a distinct example.2 In industrial organization, the case of competing 
Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) can be a close example of the aforementioned setup. If an 
RJV member can make a high quality innovation then it benefits the whole RJV, while other 
lower quality innovations by other members of the same RJV get obsolete. Similar logic 
applies to the case of patent pools competing for industry standards (e.g. 4G mobiles), where 
the main patent (best-shot) provides most competing features of a particular patent pool. The 
best-shot public good structure is also well documented and discussed in the defense 
economics and system reliability literature (Conybeare et al., 1994; Varian, 2004).3 The 
results show that in a defense or system reliability coalition, in the equilibrium the group 
member with the highest valuation exerts strictly positive effort and the others free-ride by 
exerting no effort. Our paper adds to this literature by introducing and characterizing the best-
shot contest between groups. In contrast to the aforementioned literature, we show that, in 
addition to the standard equilibrium where only ‘top guns’ fire, multiple equilibria in which 
top guns do not fire may arise. 
A behavioral background for the best-shot impact function is given in Baik and 
Shogren (1998). Clark and Konrad (2007) and Deck and Sheremeta (2012) use a best-shot 
impact function as the attack mechanism in the context of terrorism. Topolyan (2011) applies 
the best-shot technology to portray extreme form of free-riding behavior in an all-pay auction 
between two groups under symmetric valuations. Sheremeta (2011) uses the best-shot among 
                                                    
2 Cycling team events like Tour de France have some aspects of best-shot contests. Although each member of a 
team participates separately in the contest, if any member of the team finishes first, then it records the win of the 
whole team. Team archery or shooting contests have similar features in which literally the best-shot among the 
team members determines the performance of the whole team. 
3 Competing defense coalitions, such as the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, may follow the best-shot technology 
in which the best performance of the coalition member determines the performance of the whole coalition 
(Conybeare et al., 1994). The same story holds for inland security coalition comprised of different independent 
bodies such as CIA and FBI, or in the context of system reliability (Varian, 2004). 
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other impact functions to experimentally investigate group contests, without general 
theoretical analysis. However, none of the existing studies provide a thorough analysis of the 
best-shot group contests. 
We characterize the complete set of equilibria for the best-shot group contest and 
show that in each equilibrium at most one player in each group exerts strictly positive effort, 
whereas all the other players in the group free-ride by exerting no effort. Unlike Baik (1993, 
2008), who finds that in the perfect-substitutes contest only the highest-valuation member in 
each group exerts positive effort, in our best-shot contest the unique and active member in 
each group is not always the highest-valuation member in that group. Specifically, there are 
perverse equilibria in which a member whose valuation is not the highest within a group 
exerts strictly positive effort, while other members in that group, including the highest-
valuation member, free-ride by exerting no effort. These results are also different from the 
ones by Lee (2012), who shows that in equilibrium of the weakest-link contest there is no 
free-riding but there is a coordination problem due to the perfect complementarity of efforts 
among the group members. In contrast, in our best-shot contest there is severe free-riding in 
any equilibrium. Interestingly, the free-riders in each group may be the highest-valuation 
players as well as other low-valuation players. 
We also rank the possible equilibria in our model and show the conditions under 
which perverse equilibria can be avoided from the perspective of a contest designer. 
Therefore, our paper is also related to the paper by Kolmar and Wagener (2012), who 
incorporate the contest mechanism into the public goods setting in order to solve two 
efficiency failures: (1) insufficient provision of public goods (quantity problem) and (2) 
unproductive players’ contributions to the public goods (sorting problem). They examine the 
optimal structures of the CSF (contest success function) and prizes that solve these two 
problems. Focusing on the sorting problem as in Kolmar and Wagener (2012), we specify the 
5 
 
structure of players’ valuations that prevents perverse equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the 
low-valuation players in each group exert positive efforts. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present and in Section 3 we analyze 
our best-shot contest model. In Section 4, as an example, we consider a contest with three 
two-player groups. In Section 5, we discuss contest design implications and conclude by 
suggesting avenues for future research. Technical proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a contest in which ݊ ൒ 2 groups compete to win a group-specific public-
good prize. Group ݃ א ܰ, where ܰ ൌ ሼ1, 2, … , ݊ሽ is a set of groups, consists of ݉௚ ൒ 2 
risk-neutral players who exert costly efforts to win the prize. 
The individual group members’ valuation for the prize may differ within group and 
across groups. This intra-group asymmetry in values can be a result of player asymmetry, but 
it can also be interpreted as an exogenous sharing rule of the group-specific prize, in which 
the prize-shares among the members of a group are different. Let ݒ௚௜ ൐ 0 represent the 
valuation for the prize of player ݅ in group ݃. Without loss of generality, assume ݒ௚ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൒
ݒ௚௧ for ݉௚ ൒ ݐ ൐ 1, and ݒሺ௞ିଵሻଵ ൒ ݒ௞ଵ for ݊ ൒ ݇ ൐ 1. Let ݔ௚௜ ൒ 0, measured in the same 
unit as the prize values, represent the effort level exerted by player ݅ in group ݃. 
Next, we specify the group impact function as ௚݂: Թା௠೒ ՜ Թା, such that the group 
effort of group ݃ is given by ௚ܺ ൌ ௚݂ሺݔ௚ଵ, ݔ௚ଶ, … , ݔ௚௠೒ሻ. The following assumption defines 
the best-shot technology: 
Assumption 1: The group effort of group ݃ is represented by the maximum effort level 
exerted by the players in group ݃, i.e., ௚ܺ ൌ ݉ܽݔ ቄݔ௚ଵ, ݔ௚ଶ, … , ݔ௚௠೒ቅ. 
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To specify the winning probability of group ݃, denote ݌௚ሺ ଵܺ, ܺଶ, … , ܺ௡ሻ: Թା௡ ՜ ሾ0,1ሿ 
as a contest success function (Münster, 2009). Assumption 2 specifies the regularity 
conditions for ݌௚. 
Assumption 2: ݌௚ሺ0, 0, … , 0ሻ ൌ 1/݊, ∑ ݌௚௚ ൌ 1, డ௣೒డ௑೒ ൒ 0, 
డమ௣೒
డ௑೒మ ൑ 0, 
డ௣೒
డ௑ೖ ൑ 0, 
డమ௣೒
డ௑ೖమ
൒ 0 
where ݇, ݃ א ܰ  and ݇ ് ݃ . Furthermore, డ௣೒డ௑೒ ൐ 0 , 
డమ௣೒
డ௑೒మ ൏ 0  for some ܺ௞ ൐ 0 , and 
డ௣೒
డ௑ೖ ൏ 0, 
డమ௣೒
డ௑ೖమ
൐ 0 for ௚ܺ ൐ 0. 
We assume that all players forgo their efforts and they have a common cost function 
as described by Assumption 3. 
Assumption 3: ܿ: Թା ՜ Թା  is the common cost function of effort with the following 
properties: ܿሺ0ሻ ൌ 0, డ௖ሺ௫೒೔ሻడ௫೒೔ ൐ 0, 
డమ௖ሺ௫೒೔ሻ
డ௫೒೔మ
൒ 0. 
Only the members of the winning group receive the prize, while all other players 
receive nothing. Let ߨ௚௜ represent the payoff for player ݅ in group ݃. Under the above 
assumptions, the payoff for player ݅ in group ݃ is 
 ߨ௚௜ ൌ ݒ௚௜ ݌௚ሺ ଵܺ, ܺଶ, … , ܺ௡ሻ െ ܿ൫ݔ௚௜൯.                (1) 
Equation (1) along with the three assumptions represents the best-shot group contest. 
To close the structure we assume that all players in the contest choose their effort levels 
independently and simultaneously, and that all of the above (including the valuations, group 
compositions, impact functions, and the contest success function) is common knowledge. 
We use the following definitions throughout the paper. 
Definition 1: If player ݅ in group ݃ exerts strictly positive effort, i.e., ݔ௚௜ ൐ 0, then the 
player is called active. Otherwise (when ݔ௚௜ ൌ 0) the player is called inactive. 
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Definition 2: If at least one player in group ݃ exerts strictly positive effort, i.e., ௚ܺ ൐ 0, 
then group ݃ is called active. Otherwise (when ௚ܺ ൌ 0) the group is called inactive. 
 
3. The Equilibria of the Game 
We employ Nash equilibrium as our solution concept and begin by stating Lemma 1. 
This lemma points out that there are always at least two groups that actively participate in a 
best-shot contest. 
Lemma 1: In any equilibrium at least two groups are active. 
Assumption 1 gives rise to Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2: In an equilibrium only one player in each group, if any, is active. 
Next, let ݔ௚௜௕ א Թା denote the best-response of player ݅ in group ݃ in a situation 
where player ݅ is a unique player in group ݃. Lemma 3 follows. 
Lemma 3: Given the effort levels of other groups, ݔ௚ሺ௧ିଵሻ௕ ൒ ݔ௚௧௕  for ݉௚ ൒ ݐ ൐ 1. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 transform the game into a generalized version of an asymmetric 
value individual contest, whereas Lemma 3 provides restrictions on the participation of the 
players. A combination of the three lemmas gives Corollary 1 that we state without proof. 
Corollary 1: An equilibrium in which player 1s in group 1 and 2 are active always exists. 
It follows from Lemma 3 that ݔ௚ଵ௕ ൐ 0  for some ݃ ൑ ݇ ൑ ݊  and ݔ௚ଵ௕ ൌ 0  for 
݃ ൐ ݇, i.e., given the distribution of values, there can be instances in which the best response 
for every player in a group is to exert no effort, as each of their valuation is low enough and 
exerting any positive effort will result in a negative payoff. 
The general nature of the current setup restricts us from finding closed form solution 
for participation and equilibrium effort. To make the problem tractable and attain closed form 
solutions we make the following restrictive assumptions. First, following the axiomatic 
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foundation of Münster (2009) we apply a logit (Tullock, 1980) form group contest success 
function. Second, we use linear cost function with unit marginal cost. 
Assumption 2': The probability of winning the prize for group ݃ is  
 ݌௚ሺ ଵܺ, ܺଶ, … , ܺ௡ሻ ൌ ቐ
௑೒
∑ ௑ೖ೙ೖసభ
  if   ∑ ܺ௞௡௞ୀଵ ൐ 0
      ଵ௡        if   ∑ ܺ௞௡௞ୀଵ ൌ 0
. 
Assumption 3': The common cost function is ܿ൫ݔ௚௜൯ ൌ ݔ௚௜. 
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 under these two assumptions convert the best-shot group contest 
into a generalized asymmetric individual lottery contest in which each group behaves like an 
individual contestant, but the valuation of the individual contestant may change depending on 
which group member within a group is active. We use the results on asymmetric individual 
contest by Stein (2002), who shows that in an ݊-player asymmetric contest some players 
may not be active in an equilibrium. Using Proposition 1 of Stein (2002) we state the 
condition in Lemma 4 for active participation in the contest. 
Lemma 4: Suppose each player ܧ௝ in group ݆ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݇ െ 1ሺ൑ ݊ െ 1ሻ is already active. 
Then for at least one more player from any other group to be active, the following condition 
has to be satisfied:ݒ௞ଵ ൐
ሺ௞ିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕಶೕೕಬೖ
∑ ∏ ௩೟ಶ೟೟ಯೕ,೟ಬೖೕಬೖ
. 
Lemma 4 gives us a set of sufficient conditions to exclude one or more groups from 
participating in the best-shot contest. This lemma also gives Corollary 2 that shows the 
needed parametric restriction which, in turn, ensures participation of all the groups in an 
equilibrium. 
Corollary 2: If ݒ௡ଵ ൐ ሺ௡ିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕభೕಬ೙∑ ∏ ௩೟భ೟ಯೕ,೟ಬ೙ೕಬ೙  then, in an equilibrium, all ݊ groups are active. 
Based on Corollary 2, assume that first ݊ଵሺ൏ ݊ሻ groups are active in an equilibrium 
where each player ܧ௝ in group ݆ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݊ଵ is active, i.e., ݒ௡భଵ ൐
ሺ௡భିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕಶೕೕಬ೙భ
∑ ∏ ௩೟ಶ೟೟ಯೕ,೟ಬ೙భೕಬ೙భ
 and 
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ݒሺ௡భାଵሻଵ ൏
ሺሺ௡భାଵሻିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕ೘ೕೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
∑ ∏ ௩೟೘೟೟ಯೕ,೟ಬሺ೙భశభሻೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
. From Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4, one can expect that, under 
certain restrictions, there exists an equilibrium in which player 1 (the highest-valuation player) 
in each active group exerts strictly positive effort and the other group members free-ride by 
exerting no effort, i.e., ܧ௝ ൌ 1 for each active group ݆. In such a case, each highest-
valuation active player exerts the equilibrium effort in an ݊ଵ-player individual contest with 
asymmetric values as in Stein (2002). It is easy to verify that this constitutes an equilibrium 
as no player, exerting strictly positive or zero effort, has an incentive to deviate from the 
effort level. This is summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: Suppose ݒ௡భଵ ൐
ሺ௡భିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕభೕಬ೙భ
∑ ∏ ௩೟భ೟ಯೕ,೟ಬ೙భೕಬ೙భ
 and ݒሺ௡భାଵሻଵ ൏
ሺሺ௡భାଵሻିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕ೘ೕೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
∑ ∏ ௩೟೘೟೟ಯೕ,೟ಬሺ೙భశభሻೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
, 
i.e., only first ݊ଵ groups are active. Define ݔ௚ଵכ ൌ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖభషభ೙భೖసభ ൬1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒భషభ
∑ ௩ೖభషభ೙భೖసభ
൰. Then a 
profile ቀሺݔଵଵכ , 0, ڮ ,0ሻ, ሺݔଶଵכ , 0, ڮ ,0ሻ, … , ൫ݔ௡భଵכ , 0, ڮ ,0൯, ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻ, … , ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻቁ  is a Nash 
equilibrium of the best-shot group contest. 
The implication of Proposition 1 is that in the equilibrium only one of the players 
with the highest stake, or the most efficient player, exerts effort on behalf of the active group 
and all other group members free-ride by exerting no effort.4 This particular equilibrium 
indicates that in a market coalition such as an RJV or a defense coalition such as NATO, the 
most efficient player does not benefit from being a member of the coalition, instead of 
contesting as an individual player. Therefore, the equilibrium described by Proposition 1 does 
not justify the inclusion of the most efficient player in a coalition formation due to the 
                                                    
4 This equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium in a group contest with perfect-substitutes impact function as 
in Baik (1993). The equilibrium strategies are also similar to the equilibrium strategies in best-shot public good 
games (Hirshleifer, 1983). 
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exploitation of the great by the small (Olson, 1965), i.e., exploitation of the most efficient 
players by other members.5 
Coalition formation may be justified if there are perverse equilibria in which the most 
efficient players can free-ride on other players’ efforts. Or, in other words, in those equilibria 
the ‘top guns’ do not fire and there is exploitation of the small by the great. Proposition 2 
shows that indeed perverse equilibria exist, justifying the existence of market, political and 
international coalitions under best-shot technology. 
Proposition 2: Suppose ݒ௡భଵ ൐
ሺ௡భିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕభೕಬ೙భ
∑ ∏ ௩೟భ೟ಯೕ,೟ಬ೙భೕಬ౤భ
 and ݒሺ௡భାଵሻଵ ൏
ሺሺ௡భାଵሻିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕ೘ೕೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
∑ ∏ ௩೟೘೟೟ಯೕ,೟ಬሺ೙భశభሻೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
. 
Define ݔ௚ா೒כ ൌ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ೙భೖసభ ቆ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቇ where ܧ௚ ൐ 1 ׊݃ א ଵܰ ൌ ሼ1, 2, … , ݊ଵሽ . 
Then a profile ൬൫0, ڮ , 0, ݔଵாభכ , 0, ڮ ,0൯, … , ቀ0, ڮ , 0, ݔ௡భா೙భכ , 0, ڮ ,0ቁ , … , ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻ൰ is a Nash 
equilibrium of the best-shot group contest if ௩೒భ௩೒ಶ೒ ൑ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ
೙భೖసభ
ቍ
ଶ
׊݃ א ଵܰ 
Proposition 2 fully characterizes the set of equilibria for the best-shot group contest. 
This proposition shows that it is possible for a coalition to exist in which there is exploitation 
of the small by the great, and in which the most efficient player can earn a higher payoff as an 
inactive member of a group rather than contesting as an individual player. Nevertheless, the 
final payoff of each player, including the most efficient players, crucially depends on the 
equilibrium selection and the coordination between group members. 
The rent dissipation results are very different in the current analysis compared to the 
group contests with other group impact functions or the best-shot public good games. We 
know that in the case of a perfect-substitutes impact function, the total rent dissipation is 
                                                    
5 One may argue, however, that the most efficient player may still be better off being a member of the coalition, 
instead of contesting as an individual player, because it prevents the other members from exerting effort as 
potential opponents. 
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uniquely determined (Baik, 1993) and a coalition-proof equilibrium is unique in the case of a 
weakest-link impact function (Lee, 2012). It is not trivial to fully rank the equilibria in the 
best-shot case in terms of rent dissipation. The following corollary points out the highest and 
the lowest possible rent dissipation in the best-shot group contest. 
Corollary 3: The highest (lowest) possible equilibrium rent is dissipated for a given number 
of active groups, when only the highest (lowest) value players in each active group exert 
strictly positive effort. The rent dissipation is intermediate otherwise. 
 
4. An Example with Three Two-Player Groups 
To portray a simple diagrammatic explanation of our general results we consider an 
example with three two-player groups, where there are three groups and each group consists 
of two players. First, we show conditions for which one group becomes inactive and the 
contest is reduced to a contest between two two-player groups. Then we characterize the set 
of equilibria for this reduced form contest. 
As shown in Lemmas 1 and 2, in any equilibrium at least two groups will be active 
and only one player in each group will be active. One can show that there can be 20 equilibria 
in which one player in each group is active and at least two groups are active. Now we 
impose condition ݒଷଵ ൏ ௩భమ௩మమ௩భమା௩మమ. From Lemma 4, this means that both members of group 3 
have relatively low valuations of the prize and active participation in the contest ensures loss 
to them. Hence, both players in group 3 exert no effort and group 3 is always inactive. As a 
result the set of equilibria reduces to only 4. Let us denote the equilibrium in which the player 
݅ from group 1 and the player ݆ from group 2 are active as ௜ܰ௝. Then the four possible 
equilibria are ଵܰଵ, ଵܰଶ, ଶܰଵ, and ଶܰଶ. Also, define ߙଵ ؠ ௩భభ௩భమ ሺ൒ 1ሻ and ߙଶ ؠ
௩మభ
௩మమ ሺ൒ 1ሻ. 
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The necessary restrictions on parameters and the resulting equilibria are summarized in Table 
1 and are shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. 
Table 1: Equilibrium Effort and Corresponding Condition (Two Active Groups). 
Equilibrium ࢞૚૚ ࢞૚૛ ࢞૛૚ ࢞૛૛ Equilibrium Conditions 
ࡺ૚૚ ݒଵଵ
ଶ ݒଶଵ
ሺݒଵଵ ൅ ݒଶଵሻଶ 0 
ݒଵଵݒଶଵଶ
ሺݒଵଵ ൅ ݒଶଵሻଶ 0 No condition required 
ࡺ૚૛ ݒଵଵ
ଶ ݒଶଶ
ሺݒଵଵ ൅ ݒଶଶሻଶ 0 0 
ݒଵଵݒଶଶଶ
ሺݒଵଵ ൅ ݒଶଶሻଶ ߙଶ ൑ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ
ݒଶଶ
ߙଵݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
 
ࡺ૛૚ 0 ݒଵଶ
ଶ ݒଶଵ
ሺݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଵሻଶ
ݒଵଶݒଶଵଶ
ሺݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଵሻଶ 0 ߙଵ ൑ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ
ݒଵଶ
ݒଵଶ ൅ ߙଶݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
 
ࡺ૛૛ 0 ݒଵଶ
ଶ ݒଶଶ
ሺݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶሻଶ 0 
ݒଵଶݒଶଶଶ
ሺݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶሻଶ 
ߙଵ ൑ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ ݒଵଶݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
, 
ߙଶ ൑ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ ݒଶଶݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
 
 
Figure 1: The Equilibria. 
 
ݔଵଵ௕ ሺܺଶ) 
ݔଵଶ௕ ሺܺଶሻ 
ݔଶଵ௕ ሺ ଵܺሻ 
ݔଶଶ௕ ሺ ଵܺሻ 
ࡺ૚૚ 
ࡺ૛૚
ࡺ૚૛ࡺ૛૛
ܺଶ 
ଵܺ 
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 As stated in Corollary 3, the rent dissipation is highest for ଵܰଵ, lowest for ଶܰଶ and 
intermediate for the other two equilibria. This gives the flexibility to a contest designer not 
only to select the equilibrium in terms of active players but also in terms of rent dissipation. 
Depending on the distribution of values different equilibria may exist, and thus the designer 
may want to impose certain restrictions to select a set of desirable equilibria. Figure 2 
summarizes the required equilibrium conditions for ଵܰଵ, ଵܰଶ, ଶܰଵ, and ଶܰଶ equilibria in 
ߙଵ െ ߙଶ  graph. Note that the equilibrium ଵܰଵ  always exists in which ‘top guns’ fire. 
However, there are six segments of the graph where, in addition to ଵܰଵ, perverse equilibria 
exist in which ‘top guns’ do not fire. 
Figure 2: The Equilibria Conditions. 
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper we construct and analyze the best-shot group contest. We find that 
depending on the distribution of values there can be multiple equilibria, but in each 
ቌ1 ൅ ඨ ݒଵଶݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
 
ቌ1 ൅ ඨ ݒଶଶݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
 
ࡺ૚૚, ࡺ૛૛,ࡺ૛૚, ࡺ૚૛ 
ߙଵ 
ߙଶ 
ߙଶ ൌ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ ݒଵଶߙଵݒଵଶ ൅ ݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
 
1 
ࡺ૚૚, ࡺ૛૛,ࡺ૛૚ 
ࡺ૚૚, ࡺ૛૛,ࡺ૚૛ 
ࡺ૚૚, ࡺ૛૛
ࡺ૚૚, ࡺ૛૚ 
ࡺ૚૚, ࡺ૚૛
ࡺ૚૚
ߙଵ ൌ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ ݒଵଶݒଵଶ ൅ ߙଶݒଶଶቍ
ଶ
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equilibrium only one player from each group exerts strictly positive effort.6 This result is 
robust to the number of groups, the number of players in each group, and the valuations of 
players. However, the exact equilibrium strategies and rent dissipation are not uniquely 
determined and are not robust. 
We identify the conditions on the distribution of values that can give rise to multiple 
equilibria. A contest designer may use such conditions to achieve a given objective. For 
example, if individual values portray the within-group prize sharing rules, then based on the 
fairness principle (Phillips, 1997) a designer can assign players to the groups such that most 
efficient players always exert positive efforts. On the other hand, the objective of a designer 
can be to either achieve the highest efficiency (Barr, 2004) or the lowest rent dissipation 
(Tullock, 1980). In any case, the appropriate distribution of values can be selected to meet the 
objective. 
In the context of public goods and defense economics literature (Hirshleifer 1983, 
1985; Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984; Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989; Cornes, 1993) it has been 
well recognized that using best-shot technology leads to equilibria in which the most able 
players contribute to the public good. This result has been well known as the exploitation of 
the great by the small (Olson, 1965), and it has been used to argue that it is difficult to sustain 
market or defense coalitions because of the low incentives (or none) for efficient players to 
join the coalition. The current study shows that, there may be scenarios where there is 
exploitation of the small by the great, i.e., perverse equilibria in which ‘top guns’ do not fire 
and the most efficient players free-ride on other players’ efforts. This result has important 
implications, as it justifies coalition formation under the best-shot structure. 
                                                    
6  Multiple equilibria have also been documented in simple two-player lottery contests with spillovers 
(Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011). 
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The existence of multiple equilibria in the best-shot group contest also raises the issue 
of equilibrium selection (Galeotti et al., 2010; Dall’Asta et al., 2011). As in the existing 
literature, if one models the issues of system reliability or defense mechanisms in terms of 
best-shot public good game, then a unique equilibrium ensures no equilibrium selection 
concerns. However, if one models the aforementioned situations in a more realistic contest 
setting, then the existence of multiple equilibria will affect the comparative statics results. 
Hence, our findings reinforce the need for further research on equilibrium selection in 
contests with best-shot impact functions. Even in the simplest case with two two-player 
groups presented in Section 4, we show that depending on the distribution of the players’ 
valuations for the prize, the number of possible equilibria ranges from one to four. 
Furthermore, if we consider the possibility of mixed strategies (i.e., when active players in 
the same group have the same valuations), or pre-contest coordination strategies, then the 
equilibrium selection becomes even more complicated. Refining the equilibria based on 
different equilibrium selection criteria is an interesting avenue for the future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which all the groups are inactive. 
In such a case, the payoff of player ݅ in group ݃ is ݒ௚௜/݊. Now, suppose player ݅ in group 
݃ exerts an infinitesimal effort ߝ ൐ 0 instead of being inactive. Then the payoff becomes 
ݒ௚௜ െ ܿሺߝሻ ൐ ݒ௚௜/݊. Hence, all groups being inactive can never be an equilibrium. Now, 
suppose there exists an equilibrium in which only group ݇ is active. In such a case, from 
equation (1), the payoff of player ݅ in group ݃ is 0. Now suppose player ݅ in group ݃ 
exerts an effort ݔ௚௜כ ൐ 0 instead of being inactive, where ݔ௚௜כ  is the best response of player ݅ 
in group ݃ against ܺ௞ in the two-player individual contest with CSF defined in Assumption 
2. Consequently, the payoff becomes ݌௚ݒ௚௜ െ ݔ௚௜כ ൐ 0. Thus, a single active group cannot 
constitute an equilibrium either. Hence in any equilibrium there are at least two active 
groups.■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose in an equilibrium more than one player, say players ݅ and ݆, in 
group ݃ exert strictly positive efforts with ݔ௚௜ ൒ ݔ௚௝ ൐ 0. Hence, the payoff of player ݆, 
under Assumption 1, is ߨ௚௝ᇱ ൌ ݒ௚௝ ݌௚൫ ଵܺ, … , ௚ܺିଵ, ݔ௚௜, ௚ܺାଵ, … , ܺ௡൯ െ ܿ൫ݔ௚௝൯. In such a case 
it is always beneficial for player ݆ to reduce effort to zero and increase payoff to: ߨ௚௝ᇱᇱ ൌ
ݒ௚௝ ݌௚൫ ଵܺ, … , ௚ܺିଵ, ݔ௚௜, ௚ܺାଵ, … , ܺ௡൯ ൐  ߨ௚௝ᇱ . Hence, more than one player in the same group 
exerting strictly positive effort cannot be an equilibrium.■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that player ݅ in group ݃ is a unique player in the group. Then 
the best-response of player ݅ in group ݃ is the non-negative effort level that maximizes its 
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(non-negative) payoff, given the effort levels of the players in the other groups. Specifically, 
ݔ௚௜௕  is the effort level that maximizes the payoff ߨ௚௜௕ ൌ ݒ௚௜ ݌௚൫ ଵܺ, … , ௚ܺିଵ, ݔ௚௜, ௚ܺାଵ, … , ܺ௡൯ 
െܿ൫ݔ௚௜൯ subject to the non-negativity constraint ݔ௚௜ ൒ 0, and the participation constraint 
ߨ௚௜௕ ሺݔ௚௜௕ , ܺି௚ሻ ൒ 0, where ܺି௚ ൌ ሺ ଵܺ, … , ௚ܺିଵ, ௚ܺାଵ, … , ܺ௡ሻ. Since the payoff function ߨ௚௜௕  
is strictly concave, the solution ݔ௚௜௕  is unique, and satisfies the first-order condition for 
maximizing ߨ௚௜௕ , ܿԢሺݔ௚௜ሻ/ డ௣೒డ௫೒೔ ൒ ݒ௚௜. The first-order condition, jointly with Assumptions 2 
and 3, ensure that ݔ௚௜௕  is monotonically increasing in ݒ௚௜ , given ܺି௚ . Finally, this 
observation along with the assumption ݒ௚ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൒ ݒ௚௧  for ݉௚ ൒ ݐ ൐ 1  implies that 
ݔ௚ሺ௧ିଵሻ௕ ൒ ݔ௚௧௕  for all ܺି௚ ൒ ሺ0, … , 0ሻ.■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: By assumptions ݒ௚ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൒ ݒ௚௧  for ݉௚ ൒ ݐ ൐ 1, and ݒሺ௞ିଵሻଵ ൒ ݒ௞ଵ 
for ݊ ൒ ݇ ൐ 1, when each player ܧ௝ in group ݆ ൌ 1,2, … , ݇ െ 1 is already active. If player 
1 of group ݇ cannot earn positive payoff by exerting strictly positive effort, it is impossible 
for any other player ܧ௟ in group ݈ ൌ ݇, ݇ ൅ 1, … , ݊ to earn positive payoff by being active. 
Now, from Proposition 1 of Stein (2002) we know that when each player ܧ௝ in group 
݆ ൌ 1,2, … , ݇ െ 1 is active, then player 1 of group ݇ will exert ݔ௞ଵ ൐ 0 and earn strictly 
positive payoff only if the condition ݒ௞ଵ ൐
ሺ௞ିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕಶೕೕಬೖ
∑ ∏ ௩೟ಶ೟೟ಯೕ,೟ಬೖೕಬೖ
 is satisfied.■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: From Lemma 4, condition ݒ௡ଵ ൐ ሺ௡ିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕభೕಬ೙∑ ∏ ௩೟భ೟ಯೕ,೟ಬ೙ೕಬ೙  ensures that at least 
player 1 in group ݊ is always active in an equilibrium even when player 1s in all the other 
groups are active. This, along with the assumption ݒ௚ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൒ ݒ௚௧ for ݉௚ ൒ ݐ ൐ 1, means 
that at least player 1 in group ݊ is always active in an equilibrium when players other than 
player 1s from all the other groups are active. Also, if it is participation compatible for player 
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1  in group ݊ , then assumption ݒሺ௞ିଵሻଵ ൒ ݒ௞ଵ  for ݊ ൒ ݇ ൐ 1  and the properties of 
harmonic mean imply that it is participation compatible for player 1s in all the other 
groups.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that ݔ௚ଵכ ൌ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖభషభ೙భೖసభ ൬1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒భషభ
∑ ௩ೖభషభ೙భೖసభ
൰ is the equilibrium 
effort of player 1 in group ݃ when the original contest is reduced to an ݊ଵ-player contest 
which consists of the highest-valuation players in groups 1, 2, ڮ , ݊ଵ. From Lemma 4, the 
conditions ݒ௡భଵ ൐
ሺ௡భିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕభೕಬ೙భ
∑ ∏ ௩೟భ೟ಯೕ,೟ಬ೙భೕಬ೙భ
 and ݒሺ௡భାଵሻଵ ൏
ሺሺ௡భାଵሻିଶሻ ∏ ௩ೕ೘ೕೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
∑ ∏ ௩೟೘೟೟ಯೕ,೟ಬሺ೙భశభሻೕಬሺ೙భశభሻ
 restrict only 
the first ݊ଵ  groups to be active in an equilibrium. Hence, the following profile 
൫ሺݔଵଵכ , 0, ڮ ,0ሻ, ሺݔଶଵכ , 0, ڮ ,0ሻ , … , ሺݔ௡ଵכ , 0, ڮ ,0ሻ, ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻ , … , ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻ൯ is an equilibrium.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that ݔ௚ா೒כ ൌ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ೙భೖసభ ቆ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ
೙భೖసభ
ቇ  is the 
equilibrium effort of player ܧ௚ ൐ 1 in group ݃ when the original contest is reduced to the 
݊ଵ-player contest consisting of the ܧ௚th highest-valuation players in each group ݃ א ଵܰ. 
Hence, in a profile ൬൫0, ڮ , 0, ݔଵாభכ , 0, ڮ ,0൯, … , ቀ0, ڮ , 0, ݔ௡భா೙భכ , 0, ڮ ,0ቁ , … , ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻ൰ 
player ܧ௚ in group ݃ exerts strictly positive reduced-form-individual-contest effort and the 
others in the group exert no effort. For this profile to be a Nash equilibrium, no player in the 
contest should have an incentive to deviate from this profile. It is straightforward to show that 
any player ݅ ൌ ܧ௚ ൅ 1, ܧ௚ ൅ 2, … , ݉௚ in group ݃ does not have an incentive to deviate 
according to Lemma 3. 
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that player 1 in group ݃ has the highest 
incentive, if any, to deviate from this profile because ݔ௚ଵ௕ ሺܺି௚ሻ ൒ ݔ௚ଶ௕ ሺܺି௚ሻ ൒ ڮ ൒
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ݔ௚ா೒௕ ሺܺି௚ሻ. This means that if player 1 in group ݃ does not have an incentive to deviate 
from this profile, then players 2, 3, …, ሺܧ௚ െ 1ሻ in group ݃ do not have such incentives, 
either. Therefore, in order to determine if this profile is an equilibrium, it is enough to check 
if player 1 in each group ݃ has any incentive to deviate from it. 
Now we show the conditions under which player 1 in group ݃ does not deviate from 
the profile ൬൫0, ڮ , 0, ݔଵாభכ , 0, ڮ ,0൯, … , ቀ0, ڮ , 0, ݔ௡భா೙భכ , 0, ڮ ,0ቁ , … , ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻ൰ . Under this 
profile, player 1 in group ݃ exerts no effort, and the winning probability of group ݃ is 
݌௚ ൌ ቆ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቇ . Hence, the payoff of player 1  in group ݃  is ߨ௚ଵ ൌ
ݒ௚ଵ ቆ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቇ. 
If player 1 in group ݃  deviates from the profile, his optimal effort level is 
ݔ௚ଵ௕ ൫ܺି௚൯ ൌ ටݒ௚ଵ ∑ ܺ௞௡భ௞ஷ௚ െ ∑ ܺ௞௡భ௞ஷ௚ ൌ ටݒ௚ଵ ∑ ݔ௞ாೖכ௡భ௞ஷ௚ െ ∑ ݔ௞ாೖכ௡భ௞ஷ௚ ൌ 
ൌ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ೙భೖసభ ቆට
௩೒భ
௩೒ಶ೒
െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቇ. However, by deviating from the profile, this player 
earns the payoff ߨ௚ଵௗ ൌ ݒ௚ଵ ቆට ௩೒భ௩೒ಶ೒ െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቇ ቆට௩೒ಶ೒௩೒భ െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒భషభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቇ . 
Then, for player 1 in group ݃ not to deviate from the profile, we need ߨ௚ଵ ൒ ߨ௚ଵௗ , i.e., 
ߨ௚ଵ െ ߨ௚ଵௗ ൌ െ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ೙భೖసభ ቆ
௩೒భ
௩೒ಶ೒
െ 2ට ௩೒భ௩೒ಶ೒ ൅ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ
೙భೖసభ
ቇ ൒ 0 . The inequality can be 
rewritten as ߨ௚ଵ െ ߨ௚ଵௗ ൌ െ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ೙భೖసభ  ൈ ቌට
௩೒భ
௩೒ಶ೒
െ 1 െ ඨ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ
೙భೖసభ
ቍ ൈ 
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ቌට ௩೒భ௩೒ಶ೒ െ 1 ൅ ඨ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቍ ൑ 0. Therefore, the following profile 
൬൫0, ڮ , 0, ݔଵாభכ , 0, ڮ ,0൯, … , ቀ0, ڮ , 0, ݔ௡భா೙భכ , 0, ڮ ,0ቁ , … , ሺ0, ڮ ,0ሻ൰ is a Nash equilibrium if 
׊݃ א ଵܰ, ௩೒భ௩೒ಶ೒ ൑ ቌ1 ൅ ඨ1 െ ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ
௩೒ಶ೒షభ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖ
షభ೙భೖసభ
ቍ
ଶ
.■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 3: Suppose ݊ଵ  groups are active. From Proposition 2 , the total 
equilibrium rent dissipation is ∑ ݔ௚ா೒כ௡భ௚ୀଵ ൌ ∑ ቌ ௡భିଵ∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ೙భೖసభ െ ቈ
௡భିଵ
∑ ௩ೖಶೖషభ
೙భೖసభ
቉
ଶ
ቀݒ௚ா೒ିଵ ቁቍ ൌ௡భ௚ୀଵ  
ሺ݊ଵ െ 1ሻ ∏ ௩ೖಶೖ
೙భೖసభ
∑ ∏ ௩ೖಶೖ
೙భೖಯ೗
೙భ೗సభ
. Differentiating with respect to the value of an active player ݐ we get 
డ ∑ ௫೒ಶ೒כ೙೒సభ
డ௩೟ಶ೟
ൌ ሺ௡భିଵሻ
ቀ∑ ∏ ௩ೖಶೖ
೙భೖಯ೗
೙భ೗సభ ቁ
మ ൣ൫∑ ∏ ݒ௞ாೖ௡భ௞ஷ௟௡భ௟ୀଵ ൯ ∏ ݒ௞ாೖ௡భ௞ஷ௧ െ ൫∏ ݒ௞ாೖ௡భ௞ୀଵ ൯ ∑ ∏ ݒ௞ாೖ௡భ௞ஷ௟,௧௡భ௟ୀଵ ൧  
ൌ ሺ௡భିଵሻ ∏ ௩ೖಶೖ
೙భೖಯ೟
ቀ∑ ∏ ௩ೖಶೖ
೙భೖಯ೗
೙భ೗సభ ቁ
మ ൣ൫∑ ∏ ݒ௞ாೖ௡భ௞ஷ௟௡భ௟ୀଵ ൯ െ ݒ௧ா೟ ∑ ∏ ݒ௞ாೖ௡భ௞ஷ௟,௧௡భ௟ୀଵ ൧ ൌ
ሺ௡భିଵሻቀ∏ ௩ೖಶೖ
೙భೖಯ೟ ቁ
మ
ቀ∑ ∏ ௩ೖಶೖ
೙భೖಯ೗
೙భ೗సభ ቁ
మ ൐ 0 , i.e., 
the total rent dissipation is monotonically increasing in the values of the active players. 
Hence, the equilibrium in which only the highest valuation player in each group exerts 
positive effort results in the highest rent dissipation among the set of equilibria of the best-
shot group contest. Following the same logic, the equilibrium in which only the lowest 
valuation player in each group exerts positive effort, dissipates the lowest rent and the 
intermediate cases will result in intermediate rent dissipation and the ranking will depend on 
the distribution of values within and between groups.■ 
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